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Introduction 
In his famous essay Cuore Tedesco, Italian political scientist Angelo 
Bolaffi claims that after the birth of today’s global world we are 
experiencing a “pluralization of the West”1. In particular Bolaffi defines 
two moments that have contributed to distancing Europe from the United 
States, paving the way to what Alberto Martinelli calls “two variants of 
Western modernity”2. The first moment was the reunification between the 
German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 
1990. German reunification ended “the long road West”, according to the 
definition given by Heinrich August Winkler3. The second moment was the 
second Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Germany, together 
with France, for the first time strongly opposed the old ally. Revealing a rift 
 
 Internet resources, last date of access: 14 September, 2016. 
1 Bolaffi, Angelo, Cuore Tedesco: Il Modello Germania, L’Italia e La Crisi Europea, 
Roma: Donzelli, 2013. 
2 Martinelli, Alberto, Transatlantic Divide: Comparing American and European 
Society, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
3 Winkler, Heinrich August, Der lange Weg nach Westen, München: Beck, 2000.  
Germany. The Long Road West, (ed. by Alexander Sager), Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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in the transatlantic relations, which inspired German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas to talk about the “divided West”4. Many analysts believe that 
this was not the culmination, but rather the initiation of a profound crisis in 
the relationship between the United States of America and the European 
Union and that this situation is now destined to last. However, after almost 
a decade of remarked skepticism, in which the concept of “division” has 
been the stronger trend than “cohesion”, European Union and United States 
decided to finally launch in 2013 the official negotiations for the most 
important free trade agreement, in economic and geopolitical terms in the 
history of both, namely the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP).  
The aim of this paper is to take stock of the ongoing discussion and to 
understand whether TTIP could represent the common ground for a new 
Transatlanticism, or, to say it in van Ham’s words, for a “Renaissance of 
Transatlantic Relations”5. Will TTIP be the conciliation or the breaking 
point of the West? In other words, could TTIP potentially reconnect the 
two sides of the Atlantic by restoring the old partnership? This paper will 
finally try to give answers to these questions, in order to shed a bit more 
light on what has apparently turned into the “Decadence of 
Transatlanticism”. Notwithstanding the fact that the European Union and 
the United States are the main actors in the field, one cannot avoid taking 
into account the global context shaping TTIP. For this reason, this paper 
will grasp the ratio that lies behind the agreement vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world.  
How could TTIP be affected by the global context? Why today there is a 
need for the “old West” to mutually bind its economies by means of a free 
trade area? This paper will work on three different critical levels of 
analysis. The first part will survey the main matters of dispute within TTIP, 
focusing in particular on structural and cultural conflicts that make 
 
4 Habermas, Jürgen (translated by Ciaran Cronin), The Divided West. New Jersey: 
Wiley, 2006. 
5 See van Ham, Peter, TTIP and the Renaissance of Transatlanticism, Clingendael 
Report, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2014. Online at: 
www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/TIPP%20%20Peter%20van%20Ham.pdf. 
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compromises so hard to make. The second part will frame TTIP in the 
transatlantic context, with specific attention given to the consequences for 
the transatlantic relations. Finally, the third part will focus on the 
geopolitical significance TTIP carries worldwide, especially concerning the 
US strategic position towards the rest of the world. The aim of this paper is 
not to give definite answers, but rather to pose some questions that could 
trigger further investigation.  
 
1. Agreements and Disagreements: debating on what?  
Free trade agreements are very complicated, which is often forgotten since 
TTIP is in the public domain. A good part of harshest criticism tends to 
consider TTIP just a matter of paperwork, without contemplating the 
enormous amount of technical work dozens of advisory groups are 
conducting on a daily basis. As a consequence, any discussion regarding 
specific issues related to TTIP should be detailed and competent, rather 
than general and groundless. In order to understand the different 
approaches between Europe and the United States to regulation, some 
practical examples will be described, together with the specific research on 
a possible economic outlook. One of the most systematic and consistent 
works regarding TTIP’s effects is “TTIP and Fifty States: Jobs and Growth 
from Coast to Coast”6, jointly published by the Bertelsmann Foundation 
and the Atlantic Council in 2013. By considering the single economic 
structure of different American states, the study differentiates TTIP’s 
consequences on a geographical basis, proposing a distinction that would 
be even more valid on European soil. EU Member States are in fact less 
economic and far less politically integrated than US States, which means 
that European countries will not be symmetrically affected.  
Interestingly enough the most relevant matters of dispute among European 
and American regulators have been barely discussed in the media. On the 
 
6 Barker, Tyson/Collett, Anne/Workman, Garrett, “TTIP and Fifty States: Jobs and 
Growth from Coast to Coast”, Report, Washington: Bertelsmann 
Foundation/Atlantic Council/British Embassy, 2013. Online at: 
www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/TTIP_and_the_50_States_WEB.pdf. 
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contrary a lot of public debate arose around topics, either marginal or even 
completely out of TTIP’s mandate, as it has happened with GMO 
agreements. Which are the hot topics of TTIP? According to Workman and 
Smith, two key topics stakeholder issues, declared to be the most difficult 
ones. Namely the process by which regulations are established and 
implemented, plus the convergence for common standards in manufactured 
goods. The second cause of concern includes the sanitary and phytosanitary 
sector (SPS), sanitary and phytosanitary measures, financial service 
regulation, data protection and privacy. But what has kept the bloggers and 
journalists so busy? Namely national origin content quotas, audio-visuals 
sector (A/V), environmental and labor standards are considered with the 
lowest rate of importance. For that reason Tyson and Workman affirm that 
TTIP is “ambitious but achievable”7.  
As already mentioned, almost the whole agreement is about Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs), as Tariff Barriers (TBs) between the European Union and 
the United States are already rather low. In fact there is no actor involved 
that considers TBs to really be a problem, apart from the discussion around 
energy export in the United States, especially after the widespread shale 
gas and hydrofracking. Of relevant concern is the establishment of common 
principles regarding public companies and subsidies, in particular towards 
third countries like China, representing a crucial investor in both the EU 
and the US market.  
As far as foreign investments are concerned, one of the thorniest issues is 
the legal procedure for conflict resolution between home and host 
countries. The disagreement in many EU Member States concerns the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a juridical instrument to protect 
investment on foreign soil by entrusting a dispute between the State and the 
company to arbitrary external courts. For many countries such a measure 
represents an opportunity to foster foreign investments and give move 
guarantees. Others assert that, based on important international cases like 
 
7 See Barker, Tyson/Workmann, Garrett, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: Ambitious but Achievable”, Report, Washington: Atlantic Council, 
2013. Online at: www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/ttip_ambitious 
 _achievable.pdf. 
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Philip Morris vs. Uruguay8 or Vattenfall vs. Germany9, ISDS could be “a 
way to get multinational companies gets rich at the expense of ordinary 
people”10. The European Parliament strongly opposes the question of ISDS 
and, along with the Lange Report,11 proposed some solutions to overcome 
the conflict by setting more accountable and legitimate external courts12. 
However, a consistent number of members of the European Parliament 
from different groups have officially declared in the end European 
Parliament will demand ISDS to be excluded from the negotiation.  
It was curious how the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) attracted 
so much public attention, considering that foreign investment regulation is 
not a novelty, meaning that every country has always had regulations and 
guarantees with respect to foreign investments. Furthermore investment-
state resolution is an issue normally discussed on a governmental level, 
which has never been of any public interest. As soon as it was discussed on 
at European level, ISDS begun to pop-up in the news, pretending that 
guarantees towards foreign investors came out of the blue. A different story 
regards the truly difficult debate on privacy and data protection, which 
especially after the National Security Agency (NSA) scandal and the 
consequent rise of suspicion in Europe towards the United States of 
 
8 See Armitage, Jim, “Big Tobacco puts countries on trial as concerns over TTIP 
deals mount”, London: Independent, 2014. Online at: www.independent.co. 
uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/big-tobacco-puts-countries-on-trial-as-
concerns-over-ttip-deals-mount-9807478.html. 
9 See “Vattenfall vs. Germany. Nuclear Phase-Out Faces Billion-Euro Lawsuit”, 
Hamburg: Spiegel online, 2011. Online at: www.spiegel.de /international 
/germany/vattenfall-vs-germany-nuclear-phase-out-faces-billion-euro-lawsuit-a-
795466.html. 
10  See “The Arbitration Game”, London: The Economist, 2014. Online at: 
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-
souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration. 
11 Lange, Bernd, Report containing the European Parliament’s recommendation to the 
European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) , Brussels: European Parliament, 2015. Online at: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT +A8-
2015-0175+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
12 See Crisp, James, “European Parliament committee signals opposition to ISDS”, 
EurActiv.com, 2015. Online at: www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society 
/european-parliament-committee-signals-opposition-isds-311189. 
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America became an outright breaking point. To put it in the words of 
Workman and Smith, these issues have the potential to “derail negotiations 
if not handled effectively”13. 
However, despite diverse opinions on various topics, TTIP has shown two 
different cultural and political traditions of governance; namely opposite 
approaches as far as regulation is concerned. American approaches on the 
one side are based on ex-post resolutions or, in other words, “just do it”. On 
the other side, the European method is all about regulating ex-ante, which 
is sometimes visible in Sector Specific Regulation (SSR) of energy, 
telecommunications, transports, etc. This diversity is something 
transatlantic relations have been experiencing for years, ultimately with 
respect to the agenda for a climate change or for shale gas extraction. The 
United States is not likely to admit negative effects without evident 
scientific proof, whereas the European Union tends to take on 
“precautionary principles”, being cautious and diffident14. For this reason, 
on the one hand it is true that numbers and facts count, but on the other 
hand the different cultural perspectives also count in the same way, playing 
a crucial role in solving problems and the resolution of conflicts.  
2. TTIP and Transatlantic Relations 
On both sides of the Atlantic the political conditions turned to be adverse 
for negotiating TTIP within the time schedule, which had originally been 
before the end of Obama’s second mandate. The European Union is still 
dealing with economic and political instability which will be complicated 
to solve. Economic depression, although geographically delimited, is still 
there and solid growth is not a reality yet. For this reason, TTIP was 
expected to be the trigger for economic upturn as well as a measure to 
encourage Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) import and export 
with the United States. However, after the upheaval of Euroscepticism in 
the aftermath of the European Parliament elections of 2014, TTIP became 
rich soil for populist propaganda by new European nationalism from both 
 
13 See Barker/Workmann, op. cit., p. 5. 
14 See van Ham, op. cit., p. 8.  
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right and left political groups. Conservative parties in many European 
countries, traditionally in favor of free trade, became reluctant to anything 
that could boost competition to national products, thus assuming a 
protectionist attitude. After the NSA scandal, which deeply affected 
German-US relations, British Prime Minister David Cameron found 
himself isolated in his campaign in support of TTIP15 and even though 
Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi went on record regarding the necessity 
to close the negations as soon as possible, most of his party remains very 
skeptical. 
The crisis that broke out in the Mediterranean when thousands of 
immigrants were landing on European soil did not help the American 
reputation within Europe. The United States, together with France and the 
United Kingdom, is considered by many as the instigator of North African 
conflicts. Especially as far as Libya is concerned, with a massive outflow 
of migrants, Obama’s strategy “leading from behind” appears almost 
everywhere in Europe detrimental and little forward-looking. In other 
words, Europe often has the impression of bearing alone the consequences 
of common decisions. This political dynamic fits perfectly into the political 
tradition of European countries both towards EU institutions and the United 
States, where the responsibility of inaction is shifted to third parties in 
order to conceal the capability of finding common positions. On the 
European side, it is therefore crucial to frame TTIP politically, especially if 
one takes into account that the European Parliament has the power to ratify 
or not the final agreement16. 
On the side of the United States the overall political context is also rather 
complex. Despite the incisive measures taken by Obama to overcome the 
financial crisis, the Democrats lost the mid-term elections in 2014 and the 
 
15 “Who’s government working for? Cameron backing TTIP at G20 slammed by 
campaigners”, Berlin: RT news online, 2014. Online at: www.rt.com/uk/206191-
ttip-g20-cameron-growth/. 
16 “The European Parliament and the TTIP”, Brussels: European Parliament, February 
2015. Online at: www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/ 20150224 
BKG25024/html/The-European-Parliament-and-the-TTIP. 
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President became a “lame duck”17. Interestingly enough, consistent parts of 
the Republican Party (GOP) is unwilling to support the liberalization of 
international trade, supporting Obama’s decisions only when the aim is to 
isolate the US from the rest of the world. Moreover, the Congress made 
Obama’s life even harder in putting back the approval of the Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA), so-called “fast track”. In substance, the bill on 
TPA makes it easier for the American President to negotiate an 
international deal, by giving the US Congress power only to vote up or 
down the agreement, with no say during the building process. The request 
on the consent for this mechanism has been on the table for months, to such 
an extent that many US analysts started to believe that a compromise would 
never be found. In June 2015, after clamorous rejections in the months 
before, TPA passed the US Senate with unexpected collaboration with the 
Republicans and Obama has been finally empowered with exclusive 
authority on issues related to international trade18.  
At this point in time, although TPA was approved, TTIP’s obstacles in the 
United States are not over yet, since all the actors involved agree that the 
already mentioned TPP has the priority on the agenda. After all, negotiation 
on TPP is far more advanced than TTIP, either because round tables met 
less obstructionism, or because negotiation on TTP was officially opened in 
2008, which makes TPP some years older than TTIP. Together with 
strategic interests, timing is in fact a crucial variable as far as trade 
agreements are concerned. For example, if one refers to the freshly 
negotiated CETA, that is the EU-Canada treaty on free trade as well as the 
largest bilateral initiative since NAFTA, it took six years of intensive 
negotiation19. Even though TTIP was not launched out of the blue, the 
deadline set by the end of 2015, which means only two years from 
 
17 The losses of mid-term elections normally force American presidents to redefine 
the strategic for the second part of the mandate. Obama did the same. Collinson, 
Stephen, “Obama redefines the lame duck presidency”, Washington: White House, 
March 2015. Online at: www.edition.cnn.com/2015/03/17/politics/obama-politics-
white-house/. 
18 “Fast-track’ trade bill passes US Senate and awaits Obama nod”, London: BBC 
News, June 2015. Online at: see www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33265241. 
19 For more information regarding CETA, which was launched on 6th March 2009 
and signed in 2015 see www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/. 
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Obama’s opening speech, was probably very optimistic and did not take 
into account unexpected events that could have slowed down the whole 
process. Additionally, every sort of negotiation or compromise with the 
US, in particular for the EU, includes key factors that go beyond a single 
event. For this reason, considering the status-quo, TTIP will unlikely be 
negotiated and first signed within Obama’s presidency. 
In which sense could transatlantic relations benefit from TTIP? According 
to Alessandro Maran, TTIP has the potential to make “one strength out of 
two weaknesses”20. Maran starts from the assumption that the United States 
has become what Mandelbaum defined a “frugal superpower”21, meaning 
that the US is not militarily and economically capable of leading world 
order any more. Therefore, it is now time for the US to find a reliable ally 
that could complement American weakness with sufficient economic and 
military power. As Robert Kagan22 claims, US fragility does not derive 
from a domestic decline, but rather from a general sense of weariness in the 
American people to carry the burden of leading. In fact, the US is looking 
today for a role closer to domestic need and further from foreign antipathy, 
especially the one coming from its allies.23 TTIP could represent in this 
sense the trigger either for further economic cooperation overseas, or for 
further integration domestically, in particular within EU Member States.  
By creating a favorable economic area, TTIP would shrink the risk of 
unfair competition with developing countries, safeguarding at the same 
time European and American interests 24 . American and European 
companies would be more keen on pushing governments to find common 
standards, in order to jointly face global markets and deal with new and 
unexpected competitors. Concerning internal integration, the EU in 
 
20 See Maran, Alessandro, “TTIP: se due debolezze fanno una forza”, Roma: Limes, 
August 2014 p. 211-216. 
21 See Mandelbaum, Michael, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership 
in a Cash-strapped Era, New York: PublicAffairs, 2010. 
22  Kagan, Robert, “Power and Weakness”, 2015. Online at: www.users.clas.ufl. 
edu/zselden/course%20readings/rkagan.pdf. 
23 See Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New 
World Order, New York: Knopf, 2003. 
24 See Maran, op. cit., p. 215. 
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particular would undergo external pressure that could in turn foster 
compromises among EU Member States, shifting competencies and 
decisions up to the EU institutional level. One could refer for instance to 
common decisions on the EU level regarding investment or industrial 
sector, which at the very end would mean more political collaboration. The 
more optimistic observers even believe that the process will influence not 
only EU economic sphere, but other sectors as well, and ultimately Foreign 
Policy and Defense.  
These forecasts may contain some speculation, but history has shown that 
EU integration has been often a process of internal responses to external 
impulses and TTIP could be in this sense the external factor to loosen the 
ongoing impasse in the transatlantic relations. Due to the geopolitical 
reluctance of the EU, it is a fact that the US has recently turned to third 
countries to find solid strategic partners the US could rely upon. Yet, 
stronger transatlantic relations are very desirable when it comes to 
sustainable growth, with the EU being the forerunner of important issues 
such as green economy or climate change. In other words, the EU has 
specific targets in important subjects as well as high standard requests, 
which are constantly discussed in international headquarters. There is no 
possibility to transmit these concepts on a global level either alone, or 
without a partner capable of driving economic development. Someone calls 
it the “civilization of globalization” and the EU and the US are today the 
only two actors with sufficient economic and knowledge capital able to 
give precise directions that could guarantee sustainability both towards the 
people and towards the planet. For this reason, TTIP could be indeed the 
first tile of a bigger mosaic made of common values. 
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3. TTIP and the rest of the world 
There is a concept that constantly appears in literature, namely sphere of 
influence (SOI). Back in the 19th Century, when the concept was coined in 
the wake of the Monroe Doctrine, it had a precise meaning associated with 
hard power. In the 20th Century, especially during the Cold War, SOI was 
then combined with soft power as well, meaning that the influence did not 
only imply military and economic means, but also cultural ones. However, 
in the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s, US was still engaged in tests of 
strength, which saw the US superpower committing frontline troops to 
three wars in less than fifteen years. Afterwards something radically 
changed in the very concept of SOI for two reasons. In the first place, the 
EU consolidated into a Single Market, which has been the only incisive EU 
diplomatic instrument to exercise influence on the global level. European 
countries were in fact reluctant not only to give up competencies with 
respect to foreign policy, but also they have been inclined to invest less 
money in the military sector and defense. Statistically, the majority of 
European citizens have always taken a position against any military 
intervention and the EU is anything but a significant global military power. 
It goes without saying that in the globalized world, if market is the 
instrument for building SOIs, trade is the connector that could foster 
relations with third countries. This is also one of the reasons that brought 
the EU to adopt a multilateral approach vis-à-vis the rest of the world, in 
order to benefit from the geographical diversification of free trade areas. 
The second reason that changed the features of the concept of SOI is 
Obama’s resolution to find a new geopolitical role for the US that several 
scholars define as “new isolationism”. This means that the US is not 
inclined anymore to exercise its influence by leading conflicts in the front 
line, but rather from behind25, supporting allies with the intelligence and 
the use of drones. Obama came to the conclusion that intervening directly 
 
25 For more information on Obama’s strategy “leading from behind” see Calderone, 
Michael, “The New Yorker Revisits ‘Leading From Behind’: Evolution Of A Blind 
Quoteat”, New York: Huffington Post, 2011. Online at: 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/29/the-new-yorker-obama-leading-from-behind 
_n_940482.html. 
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like in Iraq or Afghanistan brought about lose-lose solutions, together with 
widespread mistrust towards United States. Nevertheless, President Obama 
is not pulling back at all the will for the US to keep the leading role, as 
“pivot to China”26 doctrine clearly showed. 
While giving notice to the Select Committee on the European Union during 
a session of the UK House of Lords on the effects of TTIP and TPP on 
world trade, Richard Baldwin said that “the US is driven by a variety of 
goals, but to a large extent its aim is to get China to stand up and play a 
leadership role in the WTO”27. In other words, in the light of a strong 
disagreement with India and China, TTIP could foster further dialogue, 
forcing China to reassess its position at the negotiating table again. Also 
former EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht officially stated in April 
2014 that “if we do a deal between the two largest economies in the world, 
it would set an important precedent for future global work”28. As van Ham 
assumes, TTIP could be the last chance for the EU and the US to play the 
leading role in setting the rules for a new multilateral global trade order, 
recovering the lost middle ground and reallocating the transatlantic West at 
world trade’s structural core29. One can thus deduce that what has changed 
is the means to fulfill SOIs, but the intent of superpowers to catch up the 
first position remains exactly the same as it was hundred years ago. 
Whether global finance and trade could be real substitutes to military forces 
it is too early to say and it will be history’s task to determine. 
In order to grasp an idea on TTIP’s potential implications in the global 
context, one may also have a look at the possible side-effects, which 
especially in Germany have been fully analyzed. Whereas there are 
 
26 For more information regarding Obama’s strategy “Pivot to China”, which today 
many analysts call rather “pivot to Asia” see “The Obama Administration's Pivot to 
Asia”, Washington: The Foreign Policy Initiative. Online at: 
www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-administrations-pivot-asia. 
27 Baldwin, Richard, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership”, Interview, 
London: House of Lords, January 2014. Online at: www.parliament.uk 
/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-c/TTIP/ucEUC230113ev18.pdf. 
28 De Gucht, Karel, “The Future of TTIP – The Benefits and How to Achieve Them”, 
Brussels: European Commission, April 2014. Online at: www.europa.eu 
/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-314_en.htm?locale=FR. 
29 See van Ham, op. cit., p. 20. 
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scholars asserting that TTIP could be the glue for a “wider Atlantic” and 
consequently for the rest of the world30, others maintain that TTIP will turn 
out to be exactly the opposite, namely the breaking point between the West 
and the East. By outlining how TTIP will possibly increase the difference 
in terms of income distribution around the world, recent research conducted 
by the Bertelsmann Foundation gave proof of a negative scenario 31 . 
According to Bertelsmann’s analysts, African countries will be overall 
affected by a decrease in the real pro capital income, with West Africa 
showing remarkably negative effects. In the same way, TTIP could be 
detrimental both for South America and South-East Asia, as well as for 
China, India and more importantly for Russia, which represents a crucial 
actor for balancing the old continent.  
This picture paves the way for a broader debate on the relationships 
between the European Union and third countries around the globe. The 
outbreak of the Ukraine crisis has changed the world. Since 1989 Europe 
has tried to rebuild relations with Russia mainly by means of energetic and 
financial interdependence. After 25 years, blotting out these efforts, the risk 
is to go back to the 20th Century global system based on block powers, 
which brought two warm wars and one “cool” war in 75 years32. In other 
words, the risk TTIP runs is to repolarize the international scenario in 
Eastern and Western blocks, vanishing EU’s efforts of building multilateral 
strategies grounded on trustworthy partnerships. Then again, what emerges 
here is the structural diversity between European Union and United States 
as far as global politics is concerned. On the one hand, by defining who are 
friends and who are enemies, US has always endorsed bilateral 
cooperation, preferring few but solid alliances. On the other hand, EU has 
 
30 See Alcaro, Riccardo/Alessandri, Emiliano, A Deeper and Wider Atlantic, Paper, 
Rom: Ministero degli Affari Esteri/Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2013, p. 
23. Online at: www.gmfus.org/file/2889/download. 
31 Felbermayer, Gabriel/Heid, Benedikt/Lehwald, Sybille, Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), Working paper, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2013. Online at: www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIP-GED% 
20study%2017June%202013.pdf. 
32 See Maran, op. cit., p. 215. 
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always drifted multilaterally, carrying on simultaneous talks, some of 
which have inevitably turned out to be lacking in stability. 
Therefore, if TTIP will be adopted in the form of an open and transparent 
FTA for every country, multilateral relations could rise from its own ashes 
even stronger than before and “regionalism may rekindle 
multilateralism”33. This would mean that TTIP will assume more European 
geopolitical attitudes, which has always favored multilateral dialogues 
rather than bipolar ones. If TTIP will tend towards the American approach, 
thus endorsing bipolarity, such influence could hold back the present 
situation, re-proposing again a dual world. In this case, American 
bilateralism could eventually bring stronger transatlantic relations but 
weaker global relations, while European multilateralism could bring an 
opposite result, namely weaker transatlantic relations but stronger global 
relations. In this sense, Richard Baldwin is probably right, when he states 
that “TTIP will never happen unless the heads of the state get involved and 
view it more as a ‘foreign policy thing than as an economic thing”34. 
Conclusion 
“Will Europe lead the 21th Century?”35 Will the 21st Century still be an 
“American Century”?36 Will China be a superpower able to shape the new 
world order? At this point in time, it is impossible to find definite answers, 
as we still live in a phase of profound transformation. Nevertheless, by 
looking at TTIP from different perspectives, one may notice that the 
agreement contains important elements which are helpful to shine some 
light on the general confusion. This paper examined in the first place the 
matters of dispute the EU and the US are facing in the TTIP negotiation 
process. Secondly, the analysis opened up the discussion to two upper 
levels, namely the consequences TTIP could have on the transatlantic 
relations and the effects of TTIP vis-à-vis the rest of world. One may 
 
33 See van Ham, op. cit., p. 11. 
34 Baldwin, House of Lords, op. cit.  
35 See Leonard, Mark, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century, London: Fourth 
Estate, 2005. 
36 See Testi, Arnaldo, Il secolo degli Stati Uniti, Bologna: Mulino Editore, 2008. 
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observe that the dynamics behind TTIP reflect the structural differences 
between the European Union and the United States that Martinelli 
compared in his work. Above all, profound diverse approaches, as far as 
regulation is concerned, finally came to surface, in particular in terms of 
ex-ante and ex-post regulation. Ex-ante regulation is in fact quintessential 
for the inner working of the EU in the field of Competition Law, while 
strong ex-post regulation is probably what distinguishes the United States 
from the rest of the world. However, there are already examples in the EU 
that show how compromises among the two models are possible and that 
there is no specific reason to believe that common standards cannot be 
found on a transatlantic level. 
Despite disagreements on specific topics, transatlantic relations are at a 
turning point, which requires the two partners to choose either to proceed 
alone accepting reciprocal weaknesses, or to move forward together, 
making “one strength out of two weaknesses”, as pointed out by Maran37. 
Furthermore, the European Union and the United States need to decide 
whether to take responsibility for the mistakes committed in the past, thus 
putting together a solid leadership with the aim of promoting sustainable 
growth on a global level. This position would mean to openly collaborate 
with China in the first place, in order to find common guidelines based on 
long-term strategies. The collaborative design corresponds exactly to the 
concept of mutual cooperation Robert Gilpin was talking about at the 
beginning of the 2000s, which the economist considered priority number 
one. TTIP represents the momentum, or better, the occasion for the 
European Union and the United States to decide the direction to take.  
To draw some conclusions, if the question is whether TTIP could reconnect 
the Atlantic, the answer is probably yes. World governance in fact cannot 
take the liberty anymore to overlook the assumption that every country, 
while growing economically, needs at the same time to promote ambitious 
social and environmental policies. However, it is clear that today there is 
no single country able to set high standards alone, as the political trade-off 
is not worth it. For this reason, one may desire that a group of countries, 
 
37 See Maran, op. cit., p. 211-216. 
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bound together by common interests, take the lead by sharing unavoidable 
risks. The European Union and the United States of America together, 
thanks to their economic and knowledge capital, have the capability of 
being the locomotive of world development. What they need is a starting 
point that could stabilize cooperation by setting credible and accountable 
institutions. Potentially, TTIP could represent this starting point, as it 
would create not only common standards, but it would also harmonize the 
processes by which common standards are established and regulated. In the 
end, European and American economies would follow common paths and 
would aim at common goals.  
The second answer to the question on whether or not TTIP could draw the 
rest of the world closer through Transatlanticism is yes, if, and only if, the 
EU and the US start to design common standards cooperatively. As China 
and the rest of the world would have no alternative but being collaborative 
regarding mutual solutions. After all, in order to be followed one has to 
lead and this is exactly the idea behind the creation of a comprehensive free 
trade area between the EU and the US. There are two risks, detrimental and 
preventable at the same time. The first is the willingness of the leaders to 
set a responsible agenda, meaning that it is not taken for granted that TTIP 
will be at the end a fully fair and transparent agreement. The second risk 
concerns always the willingness of the leaders, this time to design a global 
governance, inclusive and accountable, based on open consultations and 
shared information. Only in this way could cooperation be fulfilled, the 
actors could be equally involved and a tangible vision for the future could 
be finally grasped. 
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